"We no longer want to do any kind of business with Spain. I would like that to stop. Spain is a terrible partner in NATO. They don’t take part, they don’t pay. I don’t want anything to do with Spain. Cut all trade with Spain, please, including visits," Donald Trump declared at a joint press conference after the NATO meeting in Ankara on Wednesday.
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The US president’s remarks stand in stark contrast with how the European Union’s trade policy works. Since the creation of the single market in 1993, tariffs, trade agreements and other measures in this field fall under the EU’s exclusive competence, exercised through the European Commission.
Any potential measure targeting one of the 27 member states would have implications for the single market as a whole and could prompt a coordinated response from Brussels.
Trade flows between two of these countries are not even regarded as exports, but as “intra?EU supplies”. This level of interconnection also means, for instance, that oranges grown in Valencia can be processed in another European country before being shipped to the US, making unilateral action highly complex.
“The US federal government knows how the EU manages its trade relations and is not interested in breaking off commercial ties,” responded Teresa Ribera, the EU’s competition chief and former minister under Pedro Sánchez, last March, when asked about the issue after Trump once again threatened Spain.
How far Trump can go in following through on his threat
Even if that were not the case, Trump would have more to lose if he carried out his threats. According to 2025 data, only 4.9% of Spain’s goods exports go to the United States, worth around €18 billion, a share that makes the country less dependent than, for example, Italy (10.7%) or Germany (9.9%).
By contrast, US exports to Spain amount to some €23 billion, meaning that, technically, the US giant runs a trade surplus in this relationship. That said, exports to Spain account for only about 1.2% of total US exports.
Some sectors are more exposed than others. Capital goods and semi?manufactures, such as industrial machinery and chemical products, make up more than half of Spanish exports to the US, while food products account for around 18%.
Within these sectors, exports of engines and construction materials rank among the most sought?after Spanish goods in the US. As for foodstuffs, oils and fats, including olive oil, represent around 14% of Spanish exports crossing the Atlantic.
On tariffs, Section 122 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act places limits on Trump’s presidential powers: a cap of 15% and a maximum duration of 150 days for tariff measures, after which he would indeed need Congress to extend them. Sections 232 and 301 require prior formal investigations, lengthening the process.
Other potentially applicable unilateral measures
Beyond trade policy, Trump could impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities, both legal and natural persons, via his Bureau of Industry and Security or the Treasury Department, as happened to UN rapporteur Francesca Albanese, without congressional oversight. This can involve diplomatic restrictions, limits on banking services and travel bans affecting both public and private entities.
The Department of Commerce could also restrict the sale of US technology (semiconductors, software, defence components) to specific Spanish companies through the so?called “Entity List”. There have historically been isolated cases involving companies in EU countries, but for national security reasons, such as shell firms linked to Russia or Iran. The vast majority of current listings concern China.
Spain, however, enjoys a privileged status under the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR). It is part of country group A:5 (alongside Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea), which receives the most favourable treatment for export licences.