Did it constitute course correction, or was it the usual playing of all sides to minimise damage? Was it heartfelt to the extent anything can be in politics? Or was geopolitics forcing Delhi to create certain optics and imagery?
It's not clear, but Delhi periodically finds it necessary to burnish its 'global south credentials' while pursuing other goals, especially when the cost is low and dividend reasonable. This was a good time to create some distance from Washington and its needless war. Consider the toll the Iran war has taken on India's economy, trade, fertiliser imports and lives of seafarers caught in the crossfire.
In July, the US bombed Iran's Chabahar port, destroying a civilian control tower and endangering India's strategic investment of $120 mn and more. Some saw the bombing as Washington thumbing its nose at Delhi. The port was meant to provide India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. But its future now is unknown. Given the current difficulties in India's relations with the US, and Israel's indefensible actions in the region, the war against Iran seems less and less like a project worth defending.
So far, there's no outburst in the White House like last year when an SCO summit photo of Modi, Putin and Xi triggered Trump. The Trump regime has been briefed on both SCO and the upcoming BRICS summit in Delhi to explain the context. But none of that guarantees presidential calm. Fortunately, there's no talk by US analysts of Russia-India-China, or RIC (remember that?), coming together.
The Bishkek Declaration didn't name the US or Israel, but reiterated 'SCO's previously stated position condemning military strikes' on Iran. It called for a political and diplomatic solution. The statement then linked 'peace and stability in the Middle East' to a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question, an impossible idea in today's Israel.
Realists will dismiss the statement as 'full of sound and fury, signifying nothing', while others will see the need to reiterate principles if only to keep hope alive. India signed the statement, joining all 10 SCO member states, including Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and others. In June last year, India had stayed aloof from an SCO statement issued in the immediate aftermath of US-Israel attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities. Delhi did go on to sign the Tianjin Declaration two-and-a-half months later that condemned the US and Israel for 'gross violation of international law'. By then, it had experienced enough of Trump's second avatar.
India's signature in Bishkek is part of the continuum that some see as 'progress' in correcting the pro-US tilt. Whether summit declarations matter in the grand scheme of things is a different question altogether. But, sometimes, they do help in blunting diplomatic opprobrium.
India's decision is rooted in several realities, not the least of which is its self-declared leadership of the 'global south'. As Russia expert Nandan Unnikrishnan said, 'If we claim leadership of the global south, we have to act like a leader of the global south. Perceptions are important.' The most recent blow to the image was Modi's visit to Israel just before the war started. India came to be seen by many as part of the US-Israel-UAE axis.
An additional reason for course correction is the upcoming BRICS summit where India needs a joint statement acceptable to all. Some SCO members are also in BRICS, making for easier diplomatic give-and-take. With Xi, Putin and Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian attending, it will be interesting to see how much understanding is shown for the host's common minimum programme.
India would definitely not want the final declaration to be anti-West. China definitely would – it can feel the reins of the world in its hands. China looms large over both SCO and BRICS, dwarfing others and relentlessly pushing its foreign policy goals. Russia and India see it in real time. As for the US, its China policy depends on the day and issue at hand.
It's not a secret that Indian foreign policy is currently faced with questions for which it doesn't have ready answers, especially with regard to the US in its current 'destroyer' phase. Debates on whether India's pro-US tilt harmed other relationships (Russia, China) are intense.
There's understanding that answers (technology, investment, machinery) won't come from China. Denial is Beijing's first strategy. Russia is stretched thin by its war on Ukraine. Here's the big dilemma: India knows China and Russia are not the solution to its developmental problems. But how much can it trust the Americans?
