LAST week's phone conversation between Prime Minister Modi and US President Trump was, to go by the readouts, "productive" and "reaffirmed commitments" between India and the US. But it was in reality a damage-control exercise sparked by the threat of 100% tariffs brought on by the Graham Act and the ongoing trade friction preventing the two sides from working out a trade agreement.
The formal framing of the readout of the phone call between the two, who had in past called each other "good friends" underscored this, as did US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer's admission that the deal was not quite imminent.
The lesson is not that Delhi should wait out Trump's tenure. Those who expect a successor to restore the old intimacy are betting on a past that was already eroding. That means building depth with other middle powers, and the most consequential of these is Japan.
Japan's experience with the US has been different from that with India considering that the US is its military ally and security guarantor in a difficult region. Last year, Japan's trade agreement with the US involved 15 % tariff, a commitment to $550 billion investments in the US and $8 billion annual agriculture/ energy purchases.
Tokyo has responded with a shift in its defence policy and a sharp boost of its military expenditure. Last month, Jennifer Kavanagh of the Defense Priorities think tank in Washington DC, called for the scrapping of every single mutual defence treaty in Asia to be terminated or phased out. Today, hers may be a minority view in Washington, but you can be sure that after the experience of west Asia, people are listening.
Geography unites India and Japan as do geopolitics, economics and trade. Located on two ends of the Indo-Pacific, they are ideally suited to fill the vacuum left by the de facto US recusal from the region. Both have uncomfortable relations with China, whose industrial capacity and military is looming over the region. Both depend on sea lanes across the Indian Ocean for trade and energy.
Since the Alondra Rainbow incident of 1999, Japan has realised the significant role India could play in diplomatic and security balancing to protect its energy sea lanes. The Alondra Rainbow was captured by pirates in the South China Sea and after a chase by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard, the vessel was recaptured.
Given its military reticence, initial collaboration with India on security issues was worked through their respective Coast Guards, but now features bilateral and multilateral exercises between their armed forces.
In July, the two sides held their 16th Annual Summit in New Delhi. Here, the two unveiled a comprehensive roadmap to expand their partnership. They issued a formal Joint Statement on Energy Resilience to share experiences in building up strategic petroleum reserves. The two have also set up an LNG stockpiling task force to jointly manage disruptions and mitigate price shocks.
Protecting sea lanes is an important aspect of energy resilience. In August this year, the two sides entered into a Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation. This agreement allows the Indian Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) to share real-time maritime intelligence, conduct joint anti-piracy measures and mine counter-measure operations and grant reciprocal access to each other for ship repairs and logistics.
Japan brings in real assets here. The Indian Navy is more than twice the size of its Japanese counterpart by numbers, but in heavy ocean-going ships, Japan is roughly three and a half times larger. It also fields 23 advanced diesel-electric submarines to India's 18.
An important and ongoing aspect of their ties are the relationships relating to investment, trade and technology, which are growing by leaps and bounds. Defence technology is of special interest in view of Japan's capabilities in a range of areas. Its electronics industry is well known, but it has also developed hypersonic and unmanned combat aircraft technology.
Recently, it launched a Taigei-class submarine, whose high-capacity lithium-ion batteries make it the most advanced conventional submarine in the world. Japan also has an advanced aerospace sector developing a sixth-generation stealth fighter with the UK.
In a first ever defence technology transfer, India and Japan are collaborating in Project Unicorn for a stealth sensor mast. A major area for cooperation is AI through the India-Japan Digital Partnership and the two sides plan to place 500 Indian AI professionals in Japan by 2030.
India and Japan therefore have an opportunity that extends beyond the immediate uncertainties in their respective relationships with Washington. Neither can replace the US, nor should that be their objective. The more useful goal is to build a web of capabilities among countries that have a direct stake in keeping the Indo-Pacific open, secure and resilient. For India, Japan is particularly important because the relationship can combine maritime security, energy resilience, technology, defence production and economic security.
None of this should be oversold. Japan will not follow India on Russian oil; it has aligned with the US sanctions policy, and that limits how far either can cover for the other's exposure to Washington. For the near future, indeed, it remains a part of the US' alliance system.
But Japan needs partners capable of contributing to the security of the sea lanes that connect it to West Asia and Europe. The emerging India-Japan relationship consequently has significance beyond bilateral ties. As US strategic commitment becomes less predictable, the two countries need to create a regional balance in which responsibility for security is distributed more widely — and in which neither has to depend on Washington alone.
