The recent civil nuclear agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia has jolted the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The agreement veers off the gold standard nuclear arrangement with the UAE, permitting Riyadh to enrich uranium and reprocess nuclear waste. Though the US administration has indicated strict non-proliferation mechanisms and inspections, the possibility of weapons-grade enrichment in case of a serious threat to Saudi sovereignty cannot be ruled out. This agreement will compel other regional powers to pursue the nuclear option, triggering a nuclear competition in the region.

The 30-year deal is stated to fulfill the Kingdom’s energy requirements, providing a practicable alternative to its oil reserves. Concurrently, it also aligns with Vision 2030 of Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, as he endeavors to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons and transform the country into a modern, foreign-investment-seeking hub for the services industry. The civil nuclear program provides the country with a viable energy alternative, thus ushering it into a new era.

A deviation from 2009 gold-standard UAE nuclear deal

The current nuclear agreement signifies a departure from the 2009 gold standard civil nuclear deal between the US and the UAE. In the 2009 deal, the UAE deliberately decided to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and nuclear waste reprocessing while accepting IAEA’s additional protocols.

The Saudi leadership did not concede to IAEA’s additional protocols in this agreement. Additionally, it seeks domestic uranium enrichment for civilian purposes, which globally is accepted at 6 percent.

MBS’s nuclear weapons aspirations

The aspirations for a modern country supported by nuclear technology are marred by the explicit sentiment of the Saudi leadership about attaining nuclear weapons. Muhammad Bin Salman has categorically articulated his intention of seeking nuclear weapons in case Iran develops nuclear weapons.

The provision of an enrichment facility in the agreement, as well as the capability to reprocess nuclear waste, is an open opportunity for the Kingdom to swerve from the civilian purpose and pursue weaponisation of the nuclear program.

The agreement indicates strict inspection measures, followed by President Trump’s refusal to provide an enrichment facility to Saudi Arabia. Despite these announcements, there exist precedents like India’s Operation Smiling Buddha where civil nuclear facilities were surreptitiously diverted to weapons development. In the case of Saudi Arabia, its leadership has already pointed to such a possibility, pivoting the region towards a nuclear arms race and, in the worst-case scenario, a nuclear catastrophe.

Pathway to the Middle East’s nuclearization

The agreement comes about at a time of great unrest in the region. One party to the agreement – the US – is involved in a relentless military campaign against Iran while the other – KSA – is contesting with the Iranian-backed Houthis. The timing of the agreement likely sends a negative signal to the opposing camp, which may perceive the arrangement as an offensive maneuver.

With the agreement formalized, the Iranian regime will have two regional nuclear powers to counter – the Zionist Israel and the Sunni Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This heightens the prospects of hastening the preemptive weaponization of the Iranian nuclear program. The repute of the anti-nuke fatwa of the assassinated Ayatollah is faltering in the wake of the American onslaught on Iran, and the potential nuclearization of Saudi Arabia will push the regime over the brink.

This nuclear settlement also raises uncertainty among other regional powers like Turkey and Egypt. These powers have faced regional chaos for a long time, and the introduction of nuclear competition will greatly flare up their security dilemma.

In this scenario, these states will be ostensibly persuaded to explore the nuclear option for security as well as to assert regional credibility.

Trump’s ‘strategic’ pivot

President Trump, in his Truth Social account, linked the nuclear deal with Saudi acceptance of the Abraham Accords. Even though this brings complexity to the fruition of the nuclear deal, it does not eliminate the prospects of materialization of Saudi nuclear aspirations. The negotiations had been underway since the Biden administration, and the outcome is a mere delay in the case of Saudi refusal to recognize Israel. In addition, the US needs Saudi Arabia as a major regional power against Iran. The nuclear agreements would retain KSA in the US camp, buffering the Kingdom from the Chinese civil nuclear alternative.

Conclusion

The Saudi leadership intends to seek strategic autonomy in the face of a persistent Iranian threat, coupled with Houthi belligerence. The Israeli strikes on Qatar in 2025 further aggravated its security concerns, persuading the Crown Prince to sign a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan, which proved highly effective in shielding it from direct Iranian strikes during the US-Israel war with Iran. This strategic dilemma raises the stakes for the Saudi leadership to pursue nuclear weapons for its defence.

Such aspirations, however, tarnish the credibility of its civil nuclear deal with the US, which might prove to be disastrous for the non-proliferation regime. It will open the gates for a regional nuclear competition and hasten the arms race, cascading the region into a nuclear frenzy. The higher prospects of horizontal proliferation will have dire consequences for the strategic stability of the region, as the Middle East will be pushed towards overt nuclearization.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.