Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s Situation Report.

Here’s what’s on tap for the day: The Trump administration releases a new national security tech strategy, continues to shift the Iran war goalposts, and earmarks millions of dollars for a Gaza peacekeeping force that doesn’t exist yet.

The Trouble With Technology

Over their last 19  months in power, U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration have continuously pushed the envelope of what their signature “America First” doctrine represents for global geopolitics—threatening Europe with U.S. troop reductions, pulling back from military exercises with South Korea, and threatening to bomb Middle Eastern partners such as Oman (two of which have happened just in the last week). Trump’s national security strategy, released in December, explicitly foreshadowed a retreat from the United States’ global role and a “pull your own weight” message to U.S. allies around the world.

When it comes to technology, however, the Trump administration has clearly been forced to retreat into realism.

The White House released its new national security science and technology strategy this week, an addendum to December’s national security strategy that focuses on maintaining U.S. technological leadership. While the strategy hits some familiar notes, advocating America First policies on technology investment and arms transfers, it also proposes a level of engagement with both allies and adversaries that could contradict some of the administration’s own policies and actions.

For one, it recognizes that there are some areas where adversaries such as China (though not explicitly mentioned) are ahead of U.S. capabilities and calls for a more measured approach rather than spending to replicate the same capabilities. “Successfully shaping the competition also requires avoiding forms of technology competition where capable adversaries can readily counter U.S. moves with less effort,” the strategy reads. “We must avoid situations where competing for advantage favors adversaries and works against the objectives of U.S. strategy by expending resources without improving U.S. security.”

The document also advocates for dialogue with adversaries to avoid arms races in certain sectors: “In some areas, cooperative mutual restraint can deny competitors strategic advantage while preserving U.S. resources for higher priorities.” That tech dialogue is likely to be a key agenda item when Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Trump next month, with China’s latest strides on artificial intelligence and robotics very much top of mind in Washington.

It’s complicated. Despite Trump’s antagonization and alienation of pretty much all of the United States’ traditional allies and partners, the new strategy repeatedly stresses the need to cooperate with them to ensure that the United States maintains its global technological leadership. The strategy advocates for streamlining some export controls to make technologies such as drones more accessible to allies, balancing that cooperation with the need to keep sensitive technologies out of adversaries’ hands.

“Deeper cooperation with allies and partners is essential to protecting America’s innovation base,” the strategy says. “America benefits from networks of allies and partners with ability to contribute to our collective defense and a growing recognition of the need to do so.”

But it may be too little, too late. NATO is rapidly de-Americanizing (in response to a push from Trump), allies have been burned by sudden curbs on access to U.S. artificial intelligence models, and Europe is pushing for “tech sovereignty.” Even as the Trump administration has succeeded in corralling several allies into its Pax Silica initiative to shore up tech supply chains, it is reportedly threatening those allies with more restrictions if they join a competing Chinese initiative.

Even the strategy’s stated goal of ensuring “robust and deliberate American participation on international standards bodies” could run up against Trump’s well-documented disdain for the United Nations and other multilateral institutions that set those standards.

And the Trump administration’s restrictive immigration policies and heightened scrutiny of higher education could also impact the strategy’s assertion that “the United States will further strengthen its workforce by attracting and retaining top-tier global talent in critical national security [science and technology] fields.”

The bigger picture. Overall, the strategy appears to herald a slight shift in U.S. objectives—trying to shape the terms of tech competition itself rather than trying to outcompete adversaries in individual technologies. Undersea and space capabilities merit special mention in the military arena, while the strategy defines artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum as “transformative emerging technology areas” where U.S. leadership is imperative.

With fraught allied relationships and China waiting in the wings, that may be easier said than done.

Let’s Get Personnel

Trump on Wednesday tapped Dr. Heidi Overton to be the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. Overton, who is currently deputy director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, is a Trump loyalist, but her anti-abortion stances and support for controversial Trump administration policies on vaccines are poised to present significant obstacles for her Senate confirmation process. GOP Sen. Bill Cassidy, a physician and chair of the Senate health committee, in a post on X said he had “strong concerns about her nomination.”

“Her lack of managerial experience does not prepare her well for leading a large organization that is already dealing with staffing and morale issues. Additionally, Dr. Overton’s active role in last week’s nonsensical vaccine executive order calls into question her commitment to standing up for sound science and protecting children’s health. That alone is almost disqualifying,” Cassidy said.

On the Button

What should be high on your radar, if it isn’t already.

Pain at the pump. The Trump administration’s goals in the Iran war have been broad and confusing from the start. The war began less than a year after Trump claimed Iran’s nuclear program was “obliterated” by U.S. and Israeli strikes, for example, but the White House has consistently pointed to preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon as a central objective in the fight. In reality, the conflict has largely morphed into a fight over control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the nuclear issue hasn’t received much attention beyond the occasional statement from Trump. Vice President J.D. Vance effectively said the quiet part out loud recently, which FP’s Keith Johnson wrote about in a must-read piece this week.

Money for a stalled plan. The Trump administration informed Congress recently that it’s sending $206 million for an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The ISF is meant to serve as a peacekeeping force in the enclave as part of Trump’s peace plan. But the peace process is stalled, and the ISF does not yet exist. The news on this funding comes after Israel rejected a U.S.-backed plan to disarm Hamas. John broke down why Israel rejected the plan in a recent piece.

Snapshot

South Korean soldiers participate in an anti-terrorism exercise linked to the ongoing joint U.S.-South Korea military drills known as Ulchi Freedom Shield, at Lotte Hotel World in Seoul on Aug. 19.Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

Hot Mic

SitRep spoke with retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery earlier this week about where the Iran war stands. Montgomery, who is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said that what’s at the top of his mind right now is the impact of the war on the United States’ “long-term military readiness.”

Montgomery said the war is unlikely to be resolved prior to the midterm elections in November and could continue for months after. This means the U.S. is poised to have “two carrier strike groups, 18 destroyers, five or six extra Air Force fighter squadrons, a plurality of our Army missile defense systems, all in the Middle East unexpectedly for 12 to 18 months,” he said, which could create long-term problems that Trump’s successors may have to contend with—and U.S. adversaries like Russia and China are watching closely.

“It won’t impact President Trump, but his successor in late 2028, 2029, 2030 is going to have less carriers available, less destroyers available, and much lower readiness in the fighter squadrons and the missile defense units,” Montgomery said. “He’s creating a readiness bathtub for the force in the future when he’s no longer in office.”

On Thursday, the USS George Washington arrived in the Middle East to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln, which has been deployed for about nine months and is now heading to California. Troops aboard the Lincoln had begun to struggle with mental health issues and other challenges amid the lengthy deployment, according to recent reports.

Put On Your Radar

Sunday, Aug. 23: Kazakhstan is set to hold snap parliamentary elections.

By the Numbers

57—The number of “very powerful” nuclear weapons that Trump this week said North Korea has in its possession, though South Korea estimates Pyongyang has up to 120 nuclear warheads.

Quote of the Week

“Grass has a life, like humans have a life.”

—Trump, while giving reporters a tour of the new White House helipad.

FP’s Most Read This Week

• The Top 10 Ways Trump Has Made America Weaker by Stephen M. Walt
• Yes, the Iran War Really Is Similar to Vietnam by Howard W. French
• Liberalism Is Worth Saving. Here’s How. by Daron Acemoglu