CHINESE President Xi Jinping recently completed a three-day state visit to the United States, where he was greeted with full military honors at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. The visit included a White House ceremony, private talks, a state dinner, high-level economic discussions, and a trip to the National Archives. The visit was in reciprocation for US President Donald Trump’s own state visit to Beijing in May 2026. President Trump had already visited China as president in 2017, while Xi had last traveled to the US in 2023 for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and talks with then-president Joe Biden.
The visit took place amid serious disagreements about tariffs, technology restrictions, sanctions, and strong public statements. Reports also point to Chinese support for Iran, which American officials regard as totally unacceptable. Nevertheless, the US still offered a full state visit and continued high-level talks. Both sides kept the diplomatic channel open. They discussed limited trade agreements and planned further meetings at the APEC summit in Shenzhen, southeastern China, and the Group of 20 gathering in Miami, Florida. Symbolic steps such as the promise of pandas to an American zoo accompanied the talks.
The pattern shows a clear choice. The US and China differ on many fronts but still practice high-level engagement.
Other countries in Southeast Asia follow a similar path in relation to China. Vietnam keeps firm claims in the South China Sea while limiting public confrontation. It maintains diplomacy and even expands trade with China. Malaysia treats most incidents silently so that the dispute does not control the whole relationship. Brunei and Indonesia also avoid constant publicity. These states protect their interests but do not allow maritime differences to block cooperation with China.
The Philippines, on the other hand, follows a different path. Under Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration, the main policy has been assertive transparency. Officials release videos, photos and statements about Chinese coast guard and militia actions as soon as they occur. The approach raises the level of tension rather than lowers it. Incidents of ramming, water cannon use, and close approaches continue. Public distrust of China remains high, and the chance of miscalculation at sea has grown.
Four prominent personalities are behind the public campaign. Defense Secretary Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro Jr. often speaks in strong terms at home and abroad. Retired Supreme Court associate justice Antonio Carpio continues to argue the legal case. Philippine Coast Guard spokesman and Rear Adm. Jay Tarriela regularly publishes evidence of Chinese activity. American commentator Raymond Powell supports and explains the transparency method. These four individuals operate outside the normal limits of diplomatic practice. Foreign policy and the management of foreign relations belong to the president and the Department of Foreign Affairs. The repeated public interventions of a defense secretary, a retired Supreme Court justice, a coast guard officer, and a foreign commentator raise a basic question of proper roles.
President Marcos has publicly stated that he wants a reset in relations with China. He has spoken of the need to lower tensions and find practical ways to cooperate. The constant publicity and confrontational stance associated with the four personalities work against that goal. Their actions risk undoing the very adjustment the president wants.
The US shows that deep rivalry does not have to end high-level contact. Even the sensitive matter of Chinese links to Iran did not stop the recent state visit. Other Southeast Asian nations demonstrate that territorial disputes can be managed without permanent public escalation. The Philippines has chosen maximum visibility and steady confrontation. The result is a relationship marked by repeated incidents and limited room for diplomacy.
Power disparities and the daily pressure in the disputed waters are real. A smaller state faces plenty of risks from a major power. However, the gap between the American practice and that of the Philippines remains striking. The US continues to talk while it competes, whereas the Philippines has focused on exposure and resistance. Why the Philippines cannot or will not follow the example of engagement that the US maintains with China is still an open question.
The recent meetings in Washington offer a clear picture. Two large powers with many unresolved problems still chose diplomacy and limited cooperation. In the waters west of the Philippines, however, the pattern is one of escalation and repeated clashes. The contrast leaves a practical issue for Philippine policy. A frontline state must decide whether constant publicity and strong public language serve its long-term interest or whether a more measured mix of firmness and engagement would better protect its rights and reduce the chance of serious conflict.
While Washington and Beijing choose to communicate, Manila chooses to argue and walk away. In global politics, closing the door to dialogue does not protect a country. It leaves it alone and in danger instead.
Rafael P. Tuvera is a lawyer who taught law and political science. He analyzes geopolitics and diplomatic strategy with an emphasis on productive approaches with legal and historical context.
